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INTRODUCTION
It is not possible to understand the national security state and the reasons
which give rise to the need for dismantling it without mentioning the pro-
found and wrenching events of the last fifty years. The national security state
emerges from war, from fear of revolution and change, from the economic
instability of capitalism, and from nuclear weapons and military technology.'
It has been the actualizing mechanism of ruling elites to implement their im-
perial schemes and misplaced ideals.2 In practical terms its emergence is
linked to the rise of a bureaucracy that administered things and people in
interchangeable fashion without concern for ends or assumptions.' This state
formation matured during a period in which the office of the President be-
came supremely powerful as a broker and legitimating instrument of national
security activity.'
This paper argues in somewhat tendentious and breathless form that the
state system which has emerged in the United States is a constitutional defor-
mation which menaces the freedom and well being of its citizenry, and Which
poses a danger to world civilization. What is hanging in the balance in the last
twenty-five years of this century is whether the people, scholars, lawyers and
judges, and members of the government, can so organize their understanding
and their political actions as to avert fascism or Bonapartism, a debilitating
arms race that could end in the kind of horror from which there will be no
redemption, and a decaying economic system which impoverishes Americans
as well as people elsewhere. 5 It is this cluster of questions which public schol-
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ars and statesmen need to address and act upon during the remainder of this
century. It is the assumption of this paper that there is a contradictory and
healthy cultural movement in this direction which seeks democratization and
participation in questions of politics and economics.6 Such participation is
sought, not as an end in itself-although that would be a good end-but be-
cause more prudent and even ethical judgments would be made through
popular participation and discussion.'
I
THE NATIONAL SECURITY STATE AS THE BALLAST FOR
AMERICAN SUPREMACY IN THE WORLD
In 1945 the United States emerged from the second world war as the most
powerful nation in the world. Its allies were dependent on the United States
for the kind of economic aid that was needed to restore the pre-war social
and economic structures of Europe,8 and the vanquished were, of course, to-
tally dependent on the largesse of the United States.' The colonial areas of
the world looked to the United States for aid in their national independence
struggles against France, Great Britain, and the Netherlands."' American sci-
entists, with help from European scientists, scaled the heights to become "the
destroyer of worlds," as J. Robert Oppenheimer put it, with the atomic
bomb."' Roosevelt and Churchill had decided in 1944 that the weapon was to
be kept secret from the Soviet Union to assure immediate and complete su-
premacy at the close of the war. 2 It was no wonder that American leaders
felt a certain omnipotence and arrogance during the immediate postwar
period. American leadership had gained enormously in prestige and material
power from the second world war,' 3 and Americans were honored and re-
spected by communists and colonized people alike. Indeed, during the second
world war the American Communist Party dissolved itself to become an "as-
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sociation" because, according to Earl Browder, the American capitalists were
different from the European brand.1 4 And revolutionaries like Ho Chi Minh
modeled their Declaration of Independence after the American eighteenth
century document.'
Yet at the close of the second world war there remained profound doubts
concerning the viability of the capitalist system, doubts which had their roots
in the depression, doubts which the accomplishments of the New Deal had
not entirely eradicated. It was true that even big businessmen had begrudg-
ingly accepted the New Deal as a political success."M After all, it had succeeded
in papering over class and racial conflict by way of the political coalitions of
the Democratic Party aided by the FDR charisma. For the first time in Ameri-
can history there was a strong belief among American leaders that class con-
flict could be muted, managed, and perhaps transcended. But this assumption
was a daring one and one which was not wholly believed. On the eve of the
second world war the United States had not recovered from its economic de-
pression. The various measures which had been tried by Franklin Roosevelt
and his advisors, such as creating public works programs, curbing the excesses
of the stock market, and guaranteeing farm loans to farmers, proved insuffi-
cient to meet the challenge of an economy which was called on to respond to
"pump priming" and the contradictory programs of the New Deal.' 7 In
1938-1939 the unemployment rate of the United States was 18 percent and
there did not seem to be a means of rationalizing the needs of the people
with the short and long term interests of capitalism. From 1931 to 1940 the
jobless rate never fell below 14 percent-and in four years it averaged more
than 20 percent.1 8 It was generally assumed by government economists that
after pent-up demand had been met, the United States in a postwar situation
would again be faced with serious unemployment. It should be noted that in
1941, the last year of a quasi-mobilization economy, unemployment hovered
at 10 percent.'9
It is no wonder, then, that at the close of the second world war there
remained profound doubt about the viability of the capitalist system. As A.A.
Berle has said, "[1]n terms of power, without regard to asset positions, not
only do 500 corporations control two-thirds of the non-farm economy but
within each of that 500 a still smaller group has the ultimate decision making
14. 1. HOWE & L. COSER, THE AMERICAN CONIFUNIxST PARTY 426 (2d ed. 1962).
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REPUBLIC OF VIET NAM 5 (rev. & enl. ed. 1956).
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17. G. PERRETT, DAYS OF SADNESS, YEARS OF TRIUMlPH, THE AMERICAN PEOPLE, 1939-1945, at
173-85 (1973); A. SCHLESINGER, JR., THE ACE OF ROOSEVEL1: THE COMING OF THE NEw DEAL
(1958).
18. H. GINSBERG, UNEMPLOYMENT, SUBEMPLOYMENT, AND PUBLIC POLICY 3 (1975).
19. Id. at 6.
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power. This is, I think, the highest concentration of economic power in re-
corded history."2"' There had been an active anti-business ideology during the
depression. Business concentration and the growing cynicism about consumer
"goods" has recently caused the reemergence of this old hostility against the
big corporations, which has been analyzed by Irving Kristol:2"
The old hostility is based on what we familiarly call 'populism.' This is a sen-
timent basic to any democracy-indispensable to its establishment but also,
ironically, inimical to its survival. Populism is the constant fear and suspicion
that power and/or authority, whether in government or out, is being used to
frustrate 'the will of the people.' It is a spirit that intimidates authority and
provides the popular energy to curb and resist it.
Kristol recognizes that populism easily degenerates into paranoia in the minds
of most Americans. "[M]ost Americans are now quick to believe that 'big busi-
ness' conspires secretly but most effectively to manipulate the economic and
political system-an enterprise which, in prosaic fact, corporate executives are
too distracted and too unimaginative even to contemplate." 2
While the anti-business ideology of the depression did not reach the pro-
portion of successful demands for systemic change, it was strong enough that
at the end of the second world war it acted as a spur to business leaders to
find ways of stabilizing capitalism. It was only a scant few ,ears since the
bread lines of the depression. Broken-spirited people had been demoralized
by the contradiction Which the corporate economic system proposed to the
kind of individualism which asserted that each person "could make it on his
own." This corporate order (never contemplated by the Constitution) had ac-
cumulated masses of capital and equipment to control the productive pro-
cesses of the society so that the means of livelihood were controlled by an
oligarchic few, out of the reach of the worker or farmer. Strike turbulence in
all major industries in the 1945-1948 period fueled the corporate govern-
mental need for careful handling of the labor situation. " a During the war most
unions had accepted a no-strike pledge in exchange for certain minor man-
agement prerogatives in the plants."4 These arrangements were dissolved at
the end of the war as management sought to take back all control over life in
the factory. Truman threatened to take over the coal mines and railroads,
while draftees in the armed forces rioted to return to civilian life.'-
Thus American national life seemed to be returning to economic and so-
cial chaos in the immediate postwar period. On the international scene, the
20. A. BERLE, ECONOMIC POWER AND THE FREE SOCIETY 14 (1957).
21. Kristol, On Corporate Capitalhm in America, 41 PUB. INTEREST 126-27 (Fall 1975).
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25. J. BLUM, supra note 10, at 266.
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British informed the United States that Greece and Turkey were now Ameri-
can imperial responsibilities. In March 1947 the United States intervened in
both places and established its sphere of influence.2 6 Such "opportunities" and
problems gave rise to a different kind of governing structure; one which
would enable the United States to exercise world hegemony while ensuring
internal social and economic stability. The American leadership attempted to
reorganize the government. It would appear to be democratic and it would
appear to steer an economic and political course between socialism and fas-
cism, the two major ideologies of the twentieth century. We have referred to
this system as the national security state. It was guided by a small group of
men who, through ties of interest and social class, reacted to the world in
essentially the same way.
A center piece of the governmental reorganization was the adoption of the
National Security Act of 1947 and the creation of a National Security Council
which was to integrate "domestic, foreign and military policies relating to the
national security so as to enable the military services and the other depart-
ments and agencies of the Government to cooperate more effectively in mat-
ters involving national security. ' 27 Three major structural purposes were in-
tended to be served by this legislation. One was the development and creation
of an intelligence capability known as the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA).
It legitimated secrecy and intelligence as a necessary form of government.
Another was the reorganization of the independent armed services under the
Secretary of Defense, with a Joint Chiefs of Staff system. This system grew
out of the need to "rationalize global responsibilities" in a common planning
system. The third was to ensure that the domestic economy would make
available resources and material for defense and national security purposes. It
should be noted that while a "National Security Council" was created, no def-
inition of national security was formulated in the Act or in ensuing acts which
ostensibly dealt with national security. The concept remained one which was
to be defined through positive action and, tautologically, by those who had
exercised power in the military, financial, and bureaucratic elites. The Na-
tional Security Act allowed the various agencies to broaden and interpret their
own mandate. The consequences of vesting the national security apparatus
with such unchecked discretion were soon apparent. According to Arthur
Macy Cox, a former member of the CIA, the CIA entered into covert collec-
tion and covert operations from its incipient stages, hiring a former Nazi gen-
eral, Gerhard Gehlen, to develop an intelligence network on the Soviets.2"
26. R. BARNET, supra note 1, at 97-128; F. DUILLES, AMERICA'S RISE TO WORLD POWVER,
1898-1954, at 231-32 (1953); Paterson, The Questfor Peace and Prosperity, in PoLT ICS A.DI POLICIES
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27. The National Security Act of 1947 § 1016, 50 U.S.C. § 402(a) (1970).
28. A. COx, THE MYTHS OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY STATE 93 (1975).
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This act had immediate international significance. "There can be little doubt
that the Soviets, fearing the Germans more than any other people, were
greatly influenced in their assessment of U.S. intentions by the fact that the
United States selected Gehlen for this role. '29 Needless to say, governmental
reorganizations have their ideological import.
A. Cooling Labor Unrest
Reinhold Niebuhr, an intellectually influential exponent of the national
security state and the cold war, argued that within the United States a part-
nership had been achieved between capital and labor, and this partnership
could be maintained if organized labor were given a role in the national se-
curity system.30 Such was the impetus behind the passage of the Employment
Act of 1946,31 a piece of legislation which was viewed by its supporters as an
instrument for taming capitalism and giving the workers a stake in its mainte-
nance. The incongruities of the Act are apparent. Aimed at creating condi-
tions "under which there will be afforded useful employment opportunities,
including self-employment, for those able, willing and seeking to work, and to
promote maximum employment, production, and purchasing power, '3 2 the
Act reflected the commitment on the part of the federal government to give
attention to "maximum employment" and to fit this need into the overall
economic picture. But this picture also included policies directed toward pro-
tecting the high profits of the largest corporations, fostering a climate for the
enterprising, and building a hedge against inflation. In a word, the Employ-
ment Act was to be consistent with the needs of an economic system which
required unemployment.
The defense contract system guaranteed workers a role of sorts in the
national security system. In the fifteen-year period from 1959 to 1974, 75
percent of federal government purchases of goods and services was for mili-
tary purposes.3 3 Since it was assumed that Congress would not spend on pub-
lic services, military expenditures were used as the economic tool to hedge
against catastrophic depression. They have always been seen in this context by
29. Gehlen had been a senior planner for "Operation Barbarossa," the German invasion of
the Soviet Union. E. SPIRO [E. COOKRIDC.E], GEHLEN: SPy OF THE CENTURY 42 (1972).
30. R. NIEBUHR, CHRISTIAN REALISM AND POLITICAL PROBLEMS - (1953). Niebuhr was the
senior advisor to the Policy Planning Staff of the Department of State during the crucial early
stages of the Cold War. For a sympathetic account of his pre-World War II views, see Nichols,
Reinhold Niebuhr, Prophet in Politics, in REsPONSIBILITY OF POWER 370 (L. Krieger & F. Stern eds.
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policy planners and government economists. However, the major reason for
low unemployment figures during the postwar to 1974 period is directly re-
lated to war and war preparations. As Keynes said, a capitalist economy could
be helped through "pyramid building, earthquakes and even wars."34 The
pyramid builders of the defense industry were to be found in aviation and
electronics, although other giants were involved. According to the staff
economist of the Joint Economic Committee, "[i]n 1972, the 100 largest de-
fense contractors received 24 billion dollars in contract awards, amounting to
72.1 percent of the total awarded. The top 10 contractors received nearly half
(47.8 percent) of the value awarded to the top 100 and 31 per cent of all
awards. 3 5 It should be noted that defense acquisition no longer picks up the
unemployment slack. Indeed, in western countries there is now a correlation
between high military expenditures and high unemployment."a This is related
to the fact that defense technology requires fewer workers.
While the Employment Act of 1946 at least gave the illusion of worker
participation in the economic well being of the United States, the Taft-Hartley
Act 3 7 placed quite explicit limits on the power of organized labor. The wave
of strikes between 1945 and 1947 had aroused fears of the growing strength
of unions. In reaction to this showing of union power, the Taft-Hartley Act
implemented a right to refrain from organization and concerted activities,
made it clear that employers may express their opinions about unionism, out-
lawed the closed shop and subjected the union shop to certain limitations., and
proscribed a number of union unfair labor practices, including secondary
boycotts and jurisdictional strikes.3 8 In short, the Taft-Hartley Act served as
the instrument "to block union organization, to weaken unions and to inter-
fere with free collective bargaining. 'a The law also kept communists from
holding leadership positions in unions.
Nevertheless the position of the American worker substantially improved
over the cold war period from his/her position during the depression.4" The
overall size of the economic pie was ever increasing, but the American dream,
made tangible by this economic growth, masked the question of who would
slice the shares. An important, indeed crucial, actor in selling the American
dream was the President.
34. J. KEYNES, THE GENERAL THEORY OF EMPLOYMENT INTEREST AND ,ONEY 129 (1936).
35. Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), U.S. Dep't of Defense, 100
Largest Defense Contractors and Their Subsidiary Corporations, Fiscal Year 1974 (Oct. 9, 1974)
(unpublished report available at Directorate for Information Operations, U.S. Dep't of Defense).
36. Tobin, On the Economic Burden of Defense, in DEFENSE SCIENCE & PUBHiC PARTY 38 (E.
Mansfield, ed. 1968).
37. Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-97 (1970).
38. Id.
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B. The Presidency as the Rationalizing Instrument for Governing
Since the New Deal, economic and political clecisionmaking has shifted to
the Executive. At first it was thought by hopeful liberals and fearful conserva-
tives that the Presidency was the instrument for bringing about social reform,
in the face of a Congress which did not care to disturb constitutional stare
decisis and which favored the power of local oligarchic groups and special
interests. Of course, another analysis of the Presidency exists: It saved capi-
talism through the appearance of changing class relations and through enor-
mous political efforts at rationalizing the long term interests of the largest
corporate elements of the society with organized labor and government. 4
1
Whichever point of view is taken, James Burnham's conclusion is correct:
"Before and after 1933; before and after Franklin Roosevelt and the New
Deal,-these mark the crossing of the political line.'"" The Presidency be-
came the rationalizing instrument for the most powerful groupings in the
society. Bv the beginning of Roosevelt's third term, it was clear that the corpo-
rations, and then the military, needed the Presidency as a fundamental in-
strunent either to extend their power or to assure that they would receive as
much as they formerly received in benefits from the society. In other words,
the office of the Presidency was the victim of a deepening crisis in the politi-
cal and economic structure in the course of which leaders of corporate, police,
and military institutions sought action to "save" their class or interest.
If he is given certain legislative tools, it appears that a President can act
unchecked by the theoretical restraints which were written into our Constitu-
tion and our political system. The President can act out of whim or in further-
ance of a carefully laid out set of plans devised by "an inner circle of political
outsiders . . . composed of members and agents of the corporate rich and of
the high military in an uneasy alliance with selected professional party politi-
cians seated primarily in the Congress, whose interests and associations are
spread over a variety of local societies.143 Congress has given the President
those legislative tools and the task of being point man to save the "system" and
to rationalize the various conflicting interests of ruling groups. 44
It should be noted that first for economic reasons, and later for imperial
ones, the United States has organized itself according to national emergency
rules since 1933. There are some 470 provisions of the federal law that dele-
gate to the President, and therefore his agents, extraordinary powers during
states of emergency. This congressional delegation, coupled with so-called in-
herent powers of the President, gives him carte blanche to act as he sees fit:
41. J. O'CONNOR, supra note 1, at 49; M. RASKIN, supra note 4, at 134-39.
42. J. BURNHAM, CONGRESS AND THE AMERICAN TRADITION 129 (1959).
43. C. Nlius, supra note 2, at 231.
44. M. RASKIN, supra note 4, at 28.
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"Under the powers delegated by these statutes, the President may seize prop-
erties, mobilize production, seize commodities, institute martial law, seize con-
trol of all transportation and communications, regulate private capital, restrict
travel, and-in a host of particular and peculiar ways-control the activities of
all American citizens."4
Before Nixon, Americans believed that a President is someone above poli-
tics with no dependence on special interests. "He parades as the anointed
custodian of the eternal values, the true spirit of the people who have been
victimized by selfish warring cliques or threatened by alien and subversive
mischief-makers. '46 Where, however, a President charges too much for his
services, or where he attempts to undercut the bureaucracy which has its own
links to large economic interests or to fashion his own group of oligarchs to
replace those groupings which have dominant social voices, such a pretender
may find himself in dire trouble. Thus, the power of a modern President
rests on several elements. One is his willingness to rationalize class relations in
the society. This must not be done by tampering with those who hold great
agglomerations of property. If he is liberal-minded, he will put forward
schemes of economic growth which supposedly render "unnnecessary" any
redistribution plans. Additionally, until 1975, he was not to undermine the
military and national security apparatus grouping. Finally he is to pay obei-
sance to constitutional forms such as Congress without threatening their
existence. 47 He is to recognize their legitimizing function and find a means of
coopting it into the national security apparatus or the lockstep of the great
corporations. A President who acts accordingly can be assured of the support
of established power.
It should be noted, however, that such a President may not have the sup-
port of the people or of the various issue-oriented groups that have de-
veloped over the last fifteen years. 48 Two recent Presidents, Johnson and
Nixon, mistook electoral support for real support in the sense of depth of
commitment to them or their programs. Even though each won an election
with over 60 percent of the recorded vote, neither had a broad mass base
which believed in him or recognized a coherent and non-antagonistic set of
goals. Both men finally had to depend on particular ruling cliques which van-
ished when they became too "hot." Nixon, for example, who admired de-
Gaulle, had hoped in his second term to rule by decree as did deGaulle, but
45. SENATE SPECIAL COMM. ON THE TERMINATION OF THE NATIONAl. EMERGENCY, EMERGENCY
POWER STATUTES, S. REP. No. 93-549, 93rd Cong., 1st Sess. 1, 7 (1973). See also M. RASKIN, supra
note 4, at 29.
46. G. NOVACK, supra note 4, at 158.
47. M. RASKIN, supra note 4, at 18-25, 53.
48. L.B. JOHNSON, supra note 1.
I Page 189: Summer 1976)
LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS
he was too arrogant. 49 He told the ruling establishment once too often that it
had lost the will to rule and that he intended to replace it with his own group.
But his friends were too weak to help him. Johnson, the neo-populist, re-
flected the missionary contradictions and antagonisms of American life within
himself and his own policies. He wanted to put a carpet on everyone's floor in
America, turn Indo-China into little Johnson City, overcome a measure of
racism by bringing blacks into the American consensus, tame a new capitalist
class from the Southwest, and make educational opportunity the instrument
to forge a middle class. He thought all of these groups could mediate their
differences and be united by American imperialism.50 But Johnson failed at
stabilizing class relations, which he hoped to ameliorate by folding them into
either a war or a harmonious society of individualists and opportunists. Cities
went up in flames, the universities revolted, a terrifying war was fought for
an imperial bureaucratic purpose, and Johnson found himself governing with
Walt Rostow and the Joint Chiefs of Staff as his sole supporters.
1I
EFFECT OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY STATE
IN UNDERMINING THE RULE OF LAW
During the cold war period, the President and his immediate entourage
became the brokers for the illegitimate power wielded by the CIA, the FBI,
and the various gangs within them. They also sought to use these groups for
their own purposes. The powerful seek maximum flexibility for their objec-
tives. Ad hoc committees threaded the line between legitimacy, illegality and
crime. 51 Much of the time of a President and his advisors was spent curbing
or ratifying the excesses of lower level bureaucrats emboldened by the impe-
rial stance and the shroud of secrecy.5 2 Thus, for example, after the CIA's
failure at the Bay of Pigs, the President, the Attorney General, and NlcGeorge
Bundv undertook to control the national security bureaucracy through Max-
well Taylor and presidentially appointed committees. This "reform" more
deeply implicated the Presidency in paramilitary and criminal affairs.
It should be noted that the entire framework of "maximtun flexibility" for
leaderships and the national security bureaucracy is meant to encompass both
domestic and foreign activity. The control techniques which war and cold war
Presidents sanctioned against the poor and the "subversives" at home, and
which had been transported abroad during the cold war, were used as well
49. M. RASKIN. supra note 4, at 38-39.
50. See, e.g., Johnson, My Political Philosophy, I TEX. Q. no. 4. at 17. 17-22 (1958).
51. R. STAXINS, R. BARNET, & M. RASKIN, supra note 1, at 194-252; Hearings on S. Res. 21
Before the Senate Select Comm. to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities,
Vol. 7: Covert Actions, 94th Cong., Ist Sess. 1-136, 148-210 (1975).
52. Id.
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against the middle classes, the bureaucracies, and finally the leaders of the
major political parties.
The FBI, as well as other police agencies of the federal government, pro-
ceeded to enforce the Procrustean bed of anti-left conformist ideology inside
and outside the government. President Truman's Executive Order 9835, is-
sued in March of 1947, required loyalty oaths of government officials."3 Many
who held positions in institutions such as labor unions, universities, and the
media were purged. By 1949 they found themselves eliminated from policy
debates on the character of American society, treated as objects of contempt
or benign tolerance. (As we shall see, the nature of the debate which came to
take on new and surprising forms in the nineteen sixties was not contem-
plated by the national security state and its apparatus.) The effect of the
Truman loyalty probes and those later undertaken by Senalor Joseph icCar-
thy and J. Edgar Hoover was to enforce a view of the world based on hatred
of "communism," and to prepare an automatic defense of corporate capi-
talism as the reason for American prosperity and the justification of American
military adventures and alliances, both covert and overt. To this end the na-
tional security state was dedicated.
In Powers of Goverimnent, Bernard Schwartz outlines three fundamental
elements of the rule of law: "1) The absence of arbitrary power; 2) The sub-
jugation of the State and its officers to the ordinary law; and 3) The recog-
nition of basic principles superior to the State itself.' 5 4 The assumption of
Schwartz and others is that the rule of law is crucial to the existence of rep-
resentative democracy. Even for the radical revolutionary Thomas Paine, the
law was king: "Let a crown be placed thereon, by which the world may know
that, so far as we approve of monarchy, that in America the law is ktig." '5 5q.
A. Arbitrary Power
We shall see that the national security state and the rule of law are mortal
enemies. In the first place, by its nature and the mission which it has set for
itself, the national security state apparatus needs arbitrary power. Such power
has its own code, which is meant to govern or justify the behavior of the
initiated-after the fact. It operates to protect the state apparatus from the
citizenry. And in its defensive form it is hidden under instant and specious
doctrines such as executive privilege." This apparatus seeks to cede to the
53. Exec. Order No. 9835, 3 C.F.R. 627 (1943-1948 Compilation).
54. B. SCHWARTZ, 1 THE POWERS OF GOVERNMENT 26 (1963).
55. T. PAINE, Common Sense: Addressed to the Inhabitants of America (A New Edition 1776], in
Co,NI o SENSE AND OTHER POLITICAL WRITINGS 332 (N. Atkins ed. 1953). Common Sense lays out
the theory of natural rights, law and independence which the new nation applauded. See generally
C. BEARD & M. BEARD, THE RISE OF A,%ERICAN CIVILIZAION 237 (2d ed. rev. & enl. 1947).
56. Alas, Chief Justice Burger in his opinion, United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974),
does nothing to limit either executive privilege or confidentiality. See generaly,, Cotter, Legislative
Oversight, in CONGRESS "IHE FIRST BRANCH 25, 55 (A. de Grazia ed, abr. ed. 1967).
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discretion of officials the power of the nation's citizens to manage their future
or participate with others in that management. Government officials attempt
to control the kinds of politics and citizen activities which they (1o not favor.
They see no distinctions among geographic boundaries and are apt to operate
in essentially the same way against Americans and non-Americans. Thus, the
attempt of the CIA to assassinate Patrice Lumumba in the Congo is directly
analogous to the FBI's attempt to destroy politically Martin Luther King, Jr.
in the United States. President Nixon's sanctioning of the decisions of the 40
Committee to intervene and attempt to prevent the election of Allende
through bribe offers and other means is strikingly similar to the methods
CREEP used in Nixon's re-election campaign or to methods used against the
United States Socialist Workers Party.5 7
The police agencies have attempted to serve as a brake on the political
process. The COINTELPRO programs of the FBI have employed an as-
tonishing variety of means to disrupt the activities of groups which sought to
exercise their participatory rights. Programs like Operation Hoodwink were
meant, for example, to incite organized crimes against the Communist Party,
to entrap war objectors into undertaking bombings as in the case of the Cam-
den, New Jersey draft board affair, and to break up human and social rela-
tions by sending forged documents and threatening letters to victims of fed-
eral and local police enterprises.5 8
Break-ins, burglaries, wire-taps and buggings on the citizenry have been a
central aspect of the work of the FBI as they have undertaken to humiliate,
ridicule, and harass civil rights workers, anti-war groups, radicals, conserva-
tives, and any grouping which did not share the assumptions or the influence
of those "in charge."5 And the CIA has taken pride in training local police in
bugging, photo surveillance, and surreptitious entry.' " These incidents are
reminiscent of the struggles in Italy under Mussolini in the 1920s. Indeed, it
may be said that the virus of totalitarianism has spread from one nation to
another in the twentieth century with no exception granted to the United
States either by God or its leaders.6"
An inmportant fact (in the case of Mussolini's Italy] is that the fascist s(uiad-
rons had at their disposal .. .not only the sutsidies of their financial backers
57. Chomsky, Introduction, in COINTELPRO: THE FBI's SECRET WAR ON POLITICAL FREFEDOM
3-26 (C. Perkus ed. 1975); SENATE SELECT CO.Mis. to STuDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS ,ITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES, ALLEGED ASSASSINATION PLOTS INVOLVING FOREIGN LEAD-
ERS, S. REP. No. 465, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 19-67 (1975): [cite source alleging harassment of
Socialist Workers Party].
58. In COINTELPRO: THE FBI's SECRETI WAR ON POLITICAL FREEDOM, supra note 57. at
119-71; Hearings on S. Res. 21, Vol. 6: Federal Bureau of Investigation, supra note 51, at 1151.
Appendix 4.
59. See, e.g., Hearings on FBI Counterintelligence Programs before the Civil Rights & Constitutional
Rights Subcomm. of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 93rd Cong., 2d Sess. 10-47 (1974).
60. Ross, Surreptitious Entry, in THE CIA FILE 93-108 (R. Borosage & J. Marks eds. 1976).
61. D. GUERIN, FASCISM AND BiG BUSINESS 98 (1939).
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but the material and inoral support of the repressive lorces of the state:
police, carabinieri, and aeImy. Tihe police recruited for tile squadrotns, urging
outlaws to enroll in them and promising them all sorts of' benefits and im-
mtunitxy. The police loaned their cars to squadron meibetrs, and rejected ap-
plications for arts permits by workers and peasats while extending the
permits granted to fascists. The guardians of "law and order" had their of-
ders to rentain idle when the fascists attacked the "reds" and to intervene only
if the latter resisted. Often the police collaborated with the fascists in prepar-
ing attacks on labor organizations.
This description of fascist strategy in Italy in 1921 is striking in its resem-
blance to the approach followed by the CIA, Kissinger, Nixon, and McCone
in their successful attempt at bringing down the Marxist government of Al-
lende in Chile: 2
a) Collect intelligence on coop-minded ofl icet s; b) Cr-eate a coup climate b\
propaganda, disinformation, and terrorist activities intended to provoke the
left to give a piretext for a couL.: (Cable 611. Hq. to Sta., 10/7/70 c) Inform
those COULp-minded officers that the U.S. government would give them i ftll
support in a coup shot of direct U.S. military intervention.
The line between criminal gangs and the police is crossed often in the
national security state. The purposes may appear obscure to the average law-
abiding citizen, but the process of tyranny can be felt by the body politic
which finds reason and justice suspended for power and domination,.:
One FBI provocateur resigned wheni he was asked to arrange the bombing of
a bridge in such a way that the person who placed the booby-trapped bomb
would be killed.. This xw as in Seattle where it was revealed that FBI infiltratots
had been engaged in a campaign of arson, terrorism, and bombing of univer-
sity and civil buildings, and where the FBI arranged a robbery, entrapping a
young black tian who was paid $75 for the job and killed in a police ambush.
And the San Diego Union, on January 10, 1976, reported that the Secret
Army Organization which fire-bombed cars, burglarized the homes of anti-
war protestors, and ransacked offices, was "a centrally designed and exter-
nally financed infrastructure designed for terror and sabotage." According to
the San Diego Union, the acts took place in 1971 and 1972 and were "sanc-
tioned by the nation's most powerful and highly respected law enforcement
agency, the Federal Bureau of Investigation.""4 (This allegation has been de-
nied by the FBI.) 5
The attempt by holders of arbitrary power to inhibit people from exercis-
ing their participatory rights is invariably accompanied by forms of personal
harrassment against people who have no interest in the exercise of their
62. ALLEGE ASSASSINATION PLOTS 1NVOIviN(. FOREIGN LEADFRS, supra note 57, at 234.
63. Chomsky, supra note 57, at 15.
64. San Diego Union, Jan. 10, 1976, quoted in Newspaper Says FBI Funded Terror Unit, Washing-
ton Post, Jan. 11, 1976, at A2, cot. 1.
65. Newspaper Says FBI Funded Terror Unit, Washington Post, Jan. 11, 1976, at A2, col. 1.
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rights. Their interest is limited to carrying on ordinary functions of life. Here
the arbitrary power of the national security apparatus operates less obviously,
in a more automatic and, to the victim, less obtrusive way. We see the build-
ing up of files on a person which are used for a variety of purposes such as to
engage in blackmail or to control possibilities of' future employment for the
object-victim. This course of bureaucratic behavior is especially popular in a
period where bureaucracies grow larger, computers more sophisticated, and
leaderships more insecure. It is punctuated with the predictable danger in
which vying leadership elites use police and other records as weapons to de-
stroy their opponents or settle old scores. Such activities are common practice
in the bureaucracy of the national and "internal" security apparatus. 66 And
there is nothing in public law which sets limits for the FBI or, indeed, sug-
gests that authority exists for carrying on its comprehensive surveillance ac-
tivities in the area of "subversive activities. 67
B. Officers Above the Law
In the Dual State, specifically rejected by American law, "[llegal concepts
are not applicable to the political sphere, which is regulated by arbitrary
measures, in which the dominant officials exercise unfettered discretionary
prerogatives. ' '6 The national security state is the American version of the
Dual State. Within the national security agencies we may discern several levels
of para-legal and illegal activities.
At one level the national security apparatus operates according to a para-
legal structure Which has its own administrative and self-justifying system. It is
66. Inquin- into the Destruction of Former FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover's Files & FBI Recordkeeping,
Hearing before a Subcomm. of the House Comm. on Gov't Operations, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 59 (1975)
(hereinafter cited as Hoover Files Hearings).
67. MR. NITTI.E. [Counsel of the House Committee on Internal Security] Mr. Maronev, I
see literally nothing specific in the directives of Presidents Roosevelt and Truman which
informs us or the FBI as to the precise mission to be fulfilled by the Federal Govern-
ment in undertaking investigations of subversive activities. Has this been spelled out in
any other published or unpublished memoranda or diirectives?
NIR. IARONEY. [Deputy Assistant Attorney General] I think we are back to what we
were talking about earlier as to particular directives to the Attorneys General from time
to time.
MR. NITTiE. I see nothing in title 28. CFR which inforsims us (of the precise mnission to
be fulfilled. Wouldn't that help to inforim the FBI of the scope and nature of the inves-
tigations to be undertaken?
MR. MARON xE. The FBI has its own manual. I am trying to tell von the Attorney
General has from time to time provided them with instructions as to what to investigate
and what to furnish the Department in this area, btit it is not wrapped tip in a nice little
package.
Hearings on Domestic Intelligence Operations for Internal Security Purposes Bejore the House Comm. on
Internal Security, 93dt Cong.. 2d Sess.. pt. 1, at 3446-48 (1974).
68. B. SCiWARTZ, supra note 54, at _
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"private," having its own standards. Thus, the now famous 40 Committee is
an example of an attempt to draw the various police, military, and criminal
forces at the command of the leadership into a private and self-justifying ad-
ministrative system. "Beginning in 1955, the responsibility for authorizing
CIA covert action operations lay with the Special Group, a subcommittee of
the National Security Council (NSC) composed of the President's Assistant for
National Security Affairs, the Director of Central Intelligence, the Deputy
Secretary of Defense and the Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs. '69
Today this group, known as the 40 Committee, has been expanded to include
the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. This part of the national security
apparatus operates according to its own rules and regulations, taking little or
no account of public law and asserting its own definition of national security
and national interest-a definition which is invariably ruling class oriented.
We may refer to it as "lightly-covered" because it may or may not surface
from time to time, as in the case of the 40 Committee. When it does surface,
it seeks to justify its actions by embracing principles of positive law and of the
Dual State.
On another level, the national security state carries on activities which are
flatly illegal. At this level criminal behavior becomes an important operational
instrument. National Security Defense Memorandum 40 of 1970 points out
that the intelligence apparatus must be ready for all contingencies and must
have responses basically researched and in being.7 0 In other words, preparing
for criminality and involving or nurturing criminal behavior must be a part of
the costs of the national security state since it is never clear when such will
prove useful. This includes forgery and counterfeiting, assassination, the em-
ployment of known criminals, and so on. 7 1
CIA must necessarily be responsible for planning. Occasionally suggestions
for action will come from outside sources but, to depend entirely on such
requirements would be an evasion of the Agency's responsibilities. Also, the
average person, both in government and outside, is thinking along normal lines
and to develop clandestine cold war activities properly, persons knowing both
the capabilities and limitations of clandestine action must be studying and de-
vising how such actions can be undertaken effectively.
This kind of thinking goes beyond the para-legal procedure. It gives rise
to plans and actions of a frightful nature. An unlimited choice of means has
been extended to agents or hired contract officers. Thus, the sober William
Colby planned and carried out the Phoenix program, which resulted in the
69. ALLEGED ASSASSINATION PLOTS INVOLVING FOREIGN LEADERS, supra note 57, at 10. See also
United States v. United States Dist. Court, 407 U.S. 297, 324 (1972) (Douglas, J., concurring).
70. See text accompanying note 14 supra.
71. Directive of the National Security Council, NSC 5412/2, quoted in ALLEGED ASSASSINATION
PLOTS INVOLVING FOREIGN LEADERS, supra note 57, at 9 n.4 (emphasis added).
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killing of some twenty thousand Vietnamese. They were killed because they
were ostensibly part of the "Viet Cong's infr-astructure. 72
Another example of the policy criminal is the imaginative General Lans-
dale. He was put in charge of the MONGOOSE program to overthrow Castro
through covert means. He recommended exploiting the potential of the un-
derworld in Cuban cities to harass and bleed the community control ap-
paratus. Added to this plan was another suggestion (among thirty-one other
planning tasks) to utilize biological and chemical warfare against the Cuban
sugar crop workers.7 3 (It should be noted in passing that such activities are
proscribed by international law and would be so treated under the Personal
Accountability Bill introduced by thirty-eight members of Congress.)7 1
The Special Group minutes on June 19, 1963 suggest the manner in
which the Executive undertook war and warlike activities on its own initiative,
puIllinlg itself and the government into unaccountable policy crimes. At a
meeting in which McNamara, General Kee, Harriman, McCone, Desmond
Fitzgerald of the CIA and McGeorge Bundy were present, a sabotage pro-
gram was set out by the CIA to the members of the Special Group. It was to
be directed at "four major segments of the Cuban economy:" a) electric
power; b) petroleum refineries and storage facilities; c) railroad and highway
transportation; and d) production and manufacturing. Raids were to be con-
ducted from outside Cuba, using Cuban agents under CIA control. Missions
would be staged from a United States key.
75
Here are officers of the government who have statutorily defined respon-
sibilities in the constitutional order, acting in their hidden role as officers of
the Dual State. They cannot be reached or controlled through constitutional
or legal means. At the first meeting of the National Security Council in De-
cember 1947, "covert operations" were authorized, giving the go ahead to
criminal action.7 1 It would take us too far afield to analyze the social class bias
of the views held by this and other "executive committees" which assume a
consensus by the members of the government for the carrying out of actions
against the underprivileged and powerless persons of the earth. What are we
to make of an ambassador, Korry, who said that once Allende the marxist was
elected President, the United States would "do all within our power to con-
demn Chile and the Chileans to utmost deprivation and poverty . . ." ?r7 Or
of President Nixon and Secretary of State Kissinger who, having been embold-
ened by various multinational corporations such as IT&T and PEPSICO, pur-
72. THE CIA FILE 190 (R. Borosage & J. Marks eds. 1976).
73. ALLEGED ASSASSINATION PLOTS INVOLVING FOREIGN LEADERS, supra note 57, at 139-69.
74. H.R. 8388, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975). A memorandum in explication of the bill contain-
ing a detailed analysis of its contents appears at 121 CONG.. REC. H6396 (daily ed. July 8, 1975).
75. Id. at 173.
76. See NSC 5412/2, supra note 71.
77. ALLEGED ASSASSINATION PLOTS INoVtI.NG FOREIGN LEADERS, Supbra note 57, at 231 n.2.
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sued another attempt to bring down Allende, an attempt which was operated
through the White House and even kept secret from the 40 Committee? 78
According to Kissinger, this plan involved a group that was unknown to others
for "reasons of security" and charged with the responsibility of working with
the Chilean military in bringing about a coup against Allende.7,1 They suc-
ceeded. Suffice it to say, and I will return to this point, the consensus which
existed fifteen years ago among elites does not today exist among them. And
more to the point, this consensus is no longer shared by the American public
as a whole.
The cultural hegemony in which all classes internalized the world view of
the ruling elite has been broken-as it had to be in a democracy. It is no
wonder that this hegemony is broken, for the rule of law is challenged di-
rectly by the very operators of the state. Thus, as an example, former Vice
President Nelson Rockefeller pays an average of 10 percent tax on his total
income, approximately equal to the amount paid by the average worker who
earns $8,000 a year.8"' Simultaneously, as Chairman of the Commission to In-
vestigate the CIA, Rockefeller attempted to legitimize the para-legal activity of
the national security apparatus by turning crime into law. And in his guise as
statesman, Rockefeller was representative of those oligarchs who believe in
weak legislatures, favoring government by authorities who are responsible to
no elected officials or legislatures but merely to the most powerful economic
and military elements of the society."'
According to Justice Brandeis, "[a]t the foundation of our civil liberties lies
the principle which denies to government officials an exceptional position be-
fore the law and which accepts the same rules of conduct that are commands
to the citizen."8 " Accordingly, everyone is subject to the ordinary law and
amenable to the rules of the courts. Ostensibly, this would be the one means
of guarding against the Dual State. But the role of the courts is exceedingly
limited with regard to the national security apparatus, thus permitting the
expansion of its para-legal and illegal activities. We know when examining the
decisions of the courts that the judiciary has handled precious few cases in-
volving the CIA or the National Security Agency (NSA). The courts are fright-
ened of the Dual State, hoping that the problem will go away if no attention is
paid to it. Furthermore, where such cases have been presented to the courts,
78. Id. at 250.
79. Id. at 246-55.
80. Conflict of Interest Group, Institute for Policy Studies, The Disability of Wealth, An In-
quiry into the Nomination of Nelson Rockefeller as Vice-President (Nov. 1974) (unpublished re-
port available at the Institute for Policy Studies, 1909 Que St. Washington, D.C.).
81. Id.
82. [Brandeis source], quoted in B. SCHWARTZ. supra note 54, at _. But if. ALLEGED As-
SASSINATION PLOTS INVOLVING FOREIGN LEADERS, supra note 57, at 9.
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judges have been reluctant or unable for institutional reasons, to rule against
the secret agencies or inquire as to their activities."3
Why does the doctrine of Marbury v. Madisoii stop at the gates of Langley,
Virginia? One reason is that secret agencies specialize in lying. Indeed, they
are so structured by mission and organization as to give credence to the view
that as much as they are the children of Allen Dulles and J. Edgar Hoover,
they are also the descendants of Epimenides. A stock in trade of the CIA has
been plausible deniability. This "doctrine" is meant to protect operatives "from
the consequences of disclosures" and "to mask decisions of the President
and his senior staff members.""4 The masking process is "designed to allow
the President and other senior officials to deny knowledge of an operation
should it be disclosed." ' In other words, plausible deniability is a doctrine
which encouraged the invention of false infoirmation or lies which will be ac-
ceptable to other government agencies, the courts, and the public, as well as to
competing or uninformed groups within the secret agencies themselves. Re-
lated to the doctrine of plausible denial is the "need to know" principle. The
operational effect of "need to know" is, as Richard Barnet has said, need not
to know.86 In other words, the FBI and the CIA operate on the basis that
various groups within their own agencies, including higher officials, have little
idea of what others in the same chain of command are doing.
But democracy and its operative principle, the rule of law, require a
ground on which to stand, and that ground is, as former President Ford said
when he was installed as President, truth. 7 In this regard the government has
a higher duty to tell the truth than the citizen because it is the government
which embodies the tradition and values of the body politic as a whole. Where
the government lies or is so structured as to permit only lies and self-de-
ception, it is clear that the governing process and the organization of power
has become some other form than that originally intended or generally un-
derstood by the citizenry as the original constitutional form. The doctrines of
"plausible denial" and "need to know" present problems of particular signifi-
cance for the judiciary as enforcer of the rule of law, because with the de-
velopment of the national security state, the duty of truth-telling has been
substantially waived. Indeed, it is taken for granted that lies and masks are
the official's tools for self and group protection.
83. Alfred A. Knopf, Inc. v. Colby, 509 F.2d 1362 (4th Cir. 1975) cert. denied, 421 U.S. 992
(1974); Developments in the Law-The National Securityv Interest and Civil Liberties, 85 HARX. L. REV.
1130, 1134 (1972).
84. ALLEGED ASSASSINATION PLOTS INVOLVING FOREIGN LEADERS, supra note 57, at 11.
85. Id. at 11-12.
86. R. STAVINS, R. BARNET, & N1. RASKIN, supra note 1, at 246.
87. Remarks of President Gerald R. Ford following his swearing in as 38th President of the
United States, 10 WEEKI.I CoMlP. OF PRES. Doc. 1023, 1024 (Aug. 9, 1974).
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One example of the kind of falsification that is routine within the national
security apparatus is the GATTO incident. The U.S.S. GATTO, against orders,
drifted within one mile of the Soviet coast. A Soviet sub rammed the GATTO
somewhere between the Straits and the White Sea. The GATTO was ready to
fire a nuclear missile at the Russian sub, but the GATTO escaped without
needing to do so. The officers of the ship were requested to file two sets of
reports. One set was to consist of six copies describing the real incident as it
actually occurred, the other set to be twenty-five copies falsifying the incident.
The Pentagon admitted filing the falsified reports, but said that it filed the
true report with the 40 Committee. However, when interviewed, officials
could not locate or remember any reports about the GATTO. s8 There have
been at least four mid-ocean collisions between United States Navy and Soviet
nuclear powered and nuclear weapon carrying submarines since the mid
1960s. These were ostensibly intelligence operations which could have easily
resulted in nuclear disaster."9
Since "unacceptable" acts-that is, actions that are constitutionally, legally,
or morally questionable-are denied by the agency as a matter of course,
there has been no way for courts to test the veracity of statements of the
secret agencies. For example, how are we to know when the FBI engaged in a
particular course of conduct such as wiretapping, burglary, or entrapment?
We now learn that the FBI kept at least two separate sets of books. One set
that is available to the courts reflects the FBI's "acceptable" or "legitimate"
purposes. The other set appears to have been less pretty, and was unknown
except to the initiated. 90 To the extent it is written, this set apparently shows
the actual operations of the FBI and special groups, their special missions, and
special purposes undertaken for themselves and for special friends. But this is
not the record which the courts receive. Marbury is defeated by national se-
curity practice.
C. Basic Principles Superior to the State
According to Schwartz the third element of the rule of law is a recognition
that there are principles which are superior to the state itself. This is an im-
portant safeguard against legislatures that pass laws which may be criminal. It
is also a justification for the citizenry to act in a civilly disobedient manner
against laws or governmental acts which shock the conscience of the society.
The history of the twentieth century is replete with para-legal orders for
88. Command Study Group, R. Stavins, Chairman, Study on U.S.S. GATTO, Problems of Nu-
clear Accidents 4 (Feb. 1974) (unpublished report available at the Institute for Policy Studies,
1909 Que St. Washington, D.C.).
89. Id. at 1-7.
90. Hoover Files Hearings, supra note 66, at 36-48.
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bombings, concentration camps, assassinations, and break-ins. 91 A citizen does
not affirm or assent to every proclamation, every law, every secret rule of a
secret policy agency, whether it operates within the United States or abroad,
nor does the citizen affirm every executive order which appears to operate
under the color of the law. What we may discern instead is limited assent, a
quality which must be continuously won from its citizenry by a government. It
does so by doing justice and by recognizing human and natural rights as qual-
ities of being which indeed define personhood.
Those generally shared notions of human rights seem to be engaged in a
race against the inclinations of the national security state swollen with nuclear
weapons. There exists a seeming willingness on the part of the bureaucracy,
the military, and science to build and use weapons of mass destruction on
hundreds of millions of people because they, as a group, or their leaders, do
not see the world in similar ways as a rival set of leaders. This situation poses
a question which cannot be dodged.92 What right does a state have to commit
suicide for the people? This issue raised in its baldest form has yet to be
considered either by the people, the Congress, or the courts.
It may be asked whether the rule of law can begin to deal with any of
these issues. What help can citizens expect to have if they raise the question
of whether the state can commit suicide for the body politic by its policy of
mindless armament or its use of nuclear weapons to destroy whole classes
of people?
The courts have attempted to recognize constitutional rights of the
citizenry as they relate to equality of opportunity. They have also attempted
to give proper credence to the civil rights of people, thereby recognizing
"personhood" and those rights which attach to a person qua person as well as
those which attach to a person qua citizen. This objective has not been shared
by the police apparatus. Thus the FBI, throughout the period of the civil
rights struggles of the 1960s, had the unfortunate habit of allowing the local
police to beat and jail civil rights demonstrators. And the FBI as well as the
CIA infiltrated black nationalist groups in the ghetto for the specific purpose
of ridiculing and discrediting their organizing attempts." There was no rec-
ognition by the police agencies that the struggles of the civil rights movement
were for natural and human rights. This is not surprising. To guarantee such
rights would mean that their own activities would have to come under strict
scrutiny and finally be dismantled in favor of local neighborhood and com-
munity police. It should be noted that, based on a study of the Media Papers,
91. F. NEUMANN, BEHEMOTH 452-58 (1942); T. BECKER, AMERICAN GOVERNMENT, PAST, PRES-
ENT, FUTURE 319 (1976); R. STAVINS, R. BARNET, & M. RASKIN, supra note 1, at 284-85 (explain-
ing the use of para-law).
92. M. RASKIN, supra note 1, at 47-76.
93. In COINTELPRO: THE FBI's SECRET WAR ON POLITICAL FREEDOM. /puplr note 57, at 9-17.
110-18.
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stolen from the files of the FBI in Media, Pennsylvania, 40 percent of the
FBI's time is spent in harassing and keeping tabs on political groups which
sought some measure of recognition of their personhood.9 4 It is hardly sur-
prising that the national security apparatus, built as it is upon principles of
unaccountability, secrecy, ultra-allegiance to the state, and willingness to lie to
the courts and legislatures, is unconcerned with human or natural rights.95
(One may recall Ambassador Popper's attempt to criticize the Chilean junta
for disregarding human rights and torturing prisoners. Kissinger instructed
Popper to stop giving the junta political science lessons.) 96 Yet within the
American Constitution there is the seed of a radical understanding of the
rights of the people. Under the ninth amendment the rights of the people
cannot be disparaged, i.e., they cannot be disparaged by the government, the
secret apparatus of the government, the gangs which operate within the secret
apparatus, or the President in an effort to commit mass suicide. How is this
process to be interrupted? It is only in a continuous dialogue from the "grass
roots" that imperialism can be interrupted. Less than forty years ago the anti-
imperialist Ludlow resolution 9 7 which almost became federal law, stated that
wars could not be declared without a referendum of the people.
II1
IMPERIALISM AS A SELF-JUsI IFYING INSTRUIENT OF DOMESTIC POLICY
IN THE NATIONAL SECURITY STATE
America's historic involvement with imperialism is a complex one and is
beyond the scope of this paper. It is clear that the imperial desire has played
an important and continuous role throughout American history, ebbing and
flowing with the appetites of different leadership groups. Nevertheless, it was
not until the second world war that imperialism was seen by an entire ruling
elite as a means of permanently resolving internal problems of the United
States while exporting its cultural values around the world. At the turn of the
century, Brooks Adams saw imperialism as the only way to deal with internal
American contradictions. Less than two generations later, a leadership elite
saw American imperialism as a destiny "thrust" upon it which could save the
United States and the world on their terms. It was the United States' turn to
take the baton from the United Kingdom as the purveyor of the West's values
and traditions. If world empire was the means to protect these values, so be it.
So spoke Walter Lippmann to a more parochial-minded Charles Beard, and
Reinhold Niebuhr to his former pacifist allies such as A.J. Muste.18
94. See generally id.
95. See generally id.
96. New York Times, Sept. 28, 1974, at 9, col. 8.
97. M. RASKIN, supra note 4, at __.
98. Beard, Giddy Min& and Foreign Quarrels, 179 HtARPER*S MAc,. 337, 349 (1939): Lippmann,
What Rome Was to the Ancient World, LIFE, June 5, 1939, at _; R. NIEBUHR, CHILDREN OF Ln~ir
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To some extent this attitude was an ideological change for many Ameri-
cans. As Selig Adler, the historian, has said, "the isolationist impulse has been
woven into the warp and woof of an American epic."99 Dean Rusk once said
in a moment of candor that the American people were "carried kicking and
screaming by its leadership into world responsibility."'"0 Like Adler, he be-
lieved that Americans were by nature isolationist, although there is little in
their history which suggests this conclusion. On the other hand, there has
been a middle-western antipathy to imperialism reflected in populism and La
Follette progressivism. 10 1 To counter this American antipathy to ward im-
perialism, the leadership cloaked its actions in the language of beneficent in-
ternationalism and explained how the American isolationists brought on
World War II with their negative attitudes. The internationalism of Dean
Acheson, Richard Bissell, and Will Clayton had a distinctly material cast to it.
Thus, for example, 90 percent of the funds given by the United States to
Marshall Plan nations were spent in the United States. And as Undersecretary
of State, Clayton, a millionaire cotton broker, saved the southern cotton in-
dustry at a precarious time.1
0 2
Nevertheless, an aura of excitement was created around the imperial en-
terprise in bureaucracy. Officials believed in the importance of their work, for
they thought that they' were continuing a crusade. In personal terms middle
class achievers saw imperial activities as the new frontier for their energies
and ambitions. In poor countries, western methods of organizing people were
embraced by local bureaucrats and elites trained by the Americans. Latin
American and Asian nations organized their armed forces and internal se-
curity systems along lines laid out by the members of the national security
apparatus. For close to twenty years it was assumed that the disagreements in
public policy were not over ends, but merely means. Liberal ideologists like
Arthur Schlesinger, Jr. referred to the "vital center," intending to legitimate
the narrowness of debate. The task of liberals was to screen out views that did
not fit into the corporate liberal consensus, the ground upon which the na-
tional security apparatus was constructed.10 3
The national security bureaucracies and policy leadership invented self-
justifying "facts," premises, theories, and hypotheses. It is well to mention
AND CHILDREN OF DARKNESS 10 (1944); Schlesinger, Theology and Politics from the Social Gospel to the
Cold War, in INTELLECTUAL HISTORY IN AMERICA 158 of FOREWvORD (C. Stout ed. 1968).
99. S. ADLER, THE ISOLATIONIST 1IMPULSE: ITS TWENTIETH CENTURY 15 (1957),
100. R. STAVINS, R. BARNET, & M. RASKIN, supra note 1, at 289; H. GRAFF, [HE TUESDAY
CABINET 135 (1970).
101. See generally 1&2 B. LA FOLLFTTE & F. LA FoLLETTE, RoBERT M. LA FoLLTTE, JUNE 14,
1855-JuNE 18, 1955 (1953).
102. C. SOLBERG, RIDING HIGH, AMFIRICA IN THE COLD WAR 77 (1973).
103. A. SCHLESINGER, JR., IHE VITAL (ENTER: [HE POLITICS OF FREEDONI 156, 182-85, 255-56
(1949).
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some of these statements so that we are aware of the shallowness of thought
which guided the actions of officials. Such rag-tag ideas were the ideological
wrapping to mask narrow class interests, ungrotnded "idealistic" purposes,
and one-dimensional theories of human behavior. It was hoped that if the
slogans were said enough times the passive audience would salivate to them
like Pavlov's dogs, without critical concern. Here are some of the ideas and
official "insights": From 1967 onward the Department of Defense argued that
it would not end the war in Vietnam because of the terrible bloodbath which
would ensue. Another fiction was that the United States had no choice but to
fight limited wars in Southeast Asia, Afr ica, or wherever so that it would not
be reqtuired to fight a world war to make its point.'I
These homilies which have so guided official thinking and which have cost
the lives and property of millions of people are now unmasked and shown to
be false. As Hannah Arendt has said:''
Unable to defeat, with a "1000-to-1 stIperiority in fire power," ... a small
nation in six years of overt wairfare, unable to take care of its domestic pirob-
letus and halt the swiftt decline of its large cities, having wasted its resources to
the point where inflation and ctIurIIenCV devaluation threaten its international
trade as well as its standard of life at home, the COtiixIi is inl danger of losing
mtIch more than its claim to world leadership. And even if one anticipates the
jidginent of future historians who tmight see this development in the context
of twenieth-centcn hListoy x, when the defeated nations in two world wars
managed to come out oii top in competition with the victors (chiefly because
they were compelled by the Victors to rid themselxes for a relativelx long
periiod of the incredible wxastef tlieIss of arimaments and military expenses). it
remains hard to reconcile oneself to so iiuch effoit wasted on demonstrating
the iipotence of bigness ...
By 1974 the tumply -duttpty fantasy world could tIot long be sustained. As a
coup against the coup was generated against Nixon, and as United States
forces left Indo-China bewildered, pleased, and beaten, the era of false con-
sciousness ended. It is not likely that the citizenry will again accept the cliches
and self deceptions of the corporate and bureaucratic instittitions of the
society.
This is particularly true in the cities where the tax structure and the habits
of mind of the oligarchs and national secur ity managers have imposed great
burdens.''" The public life of the cities and tlheir possibilities as organic liv-
able units have been badly damaged by the national security state's voracious
capital rCqLir-ements, its need of labor talent, and its habit of tutrIing the
104. J. VARBURG, THi- UNITED STATES IN THE POST-WAR \WORLD 184 (1966). Warburg dis-
cusses the Rusk doctrine in which the United States can get along militarily or otherwise to
withstand Communism.
105. H. ARENDT, CRIsIS O [HE REPIUBiic 33-34 (1972).
106. L. MUMFORD, THE CiT' iN HISIOR)" 533-40 (1961); Study Group on the Federal Budget,
Institute for Policy Studies, The Problem of the Federal Budget (Nov. 1975) (unpublished repom
available at the Institute for Policy Studies, Washington, D.C.).
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attention of the people to abstract and glorious adventures which escape the
hum-drun. The imperial enterprise has enabled people to identify with the
unauthentic. The dull work of making places that children could play in, or
buildings that people could live and work in, was never able to match the
overthrow of Arbenz or the romance of making nuclear weapons. The social
energy of the nation went to the moon shots, wars and their preparation, or
paving highways to escape the cities. The nation manifested its choices in the
development of imperial architecture as in Albany, New York or Washing-
ton, D.C.
The contradiction between the city and the national security state will
grow greater over the next decade, as it becomes clear to all that to retain the
imperial conceit, the alliances, the bureaucratic apparatus, the global corpora-
tions, and so on, greater and greater sacrifices will be required of the people
in the cities-especially working and middle-class. 10 7
Leaving aside the misplaced Niebuhrian fervor or the subtle racist and
elitist bias of United States leadership, a conservative pragmatist might well
begin to question the entire imperial anti-communist enterprise from the
enterprise's own assumptions and goals. Imagine that you were a follower of
the conservatism of Robert Taft, Jr. What might you now say? In the space of
twenty-five years, the following events have occurred:
1. China became communist even though the United States committed
billions in material, employed Marines on the side of the Kuomintang cause,
and attempted to subvert the Communists and isolate them. Twenty-five years
later Chinese leadership was recognized by the United States on its own
terms. American leaders journey to China for a blessing from the heroes of
the Long March and are treated to anti-Soviet lectures.
2. Twenty years ago the Korean war, in which the United States commit-
ted 475 thousand troops at one time, was fought to a standstill, without vic-
tory. The United States lost 47 thousand soldiers in that police action which
ended up sorely testing civilian control over the military.1' 8 Needless to say, the
flames of McCarthyism were fanned by the war. A decade later, with one
American President, Lyndon Johnson, saying that the United States had no
interests in Indo-China, the United States spend $160 billion, lost 60 thou-
sand men, and wounded 250 thousand others, °9 while internal contradictions
in the American economy were made more obvious. 1 0
3. The United States corporations, much in the manner originally sug-
107. L. MuM1FORD, supra note 106, at 548-60.
108. R. LECKIE, THE WARS OF AMERICA 858 (1968).
109. Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), U.S. Dep't of Defense, U.S.
Casualties in Viet Nam, Jan. 1, 1961 - Oct. 31, 1975 (Jan. 15, 1976) (unpublished report available
from Directorate for Information Operations, Dep't of Defense).
110. Raskin, Towards a Modern National Security Policy, in The Problem of the Federal
Budget, supra note 106, at 51.
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gested by Donald Nelson in the mid-forties,"'' seek markets for merchandise
in the Soviet Union, believing that trade is the sine qua non for taming the
Soviets and maintaining capitalism. Multinationals cursed Senator Jackson for
his amendment to the Trade Act, saying that it has cost American companies
$2 billion in trade with the Soviets.' 1 2 In Portugal, meanwhile, American na-
tional security managers are faced with a choice of supporting either con-
munism or socialism. Ninety miles from home the State Department and var-
Otis groups within the foreign policy elite seek ways to open relations with the
Cubans even as the Cubans insist that the United States give independence to
Puerto Rico, and impoverished Trinidad supports Puerto Rican independence
without a whisper of United States criticism.a113
4. In Western Europe Henry Kissinger has fought a rear guard battle
with the center parties, the Christian Democrats and members of the capitalist
class who want to include the Communist party in governing coalitions of
France and Italy. Even now there is evidence of multinational corporations
helping the communist parties of Western Europe on the theory that it will
benefit trade, while the CIA sent $6 million to influence the elections. ' 4
Italians point to the arrangement of FIAT with the Soviet Union, producing
the Togliatti car in no less than a joint operating arrangement.
Against the background of events, would not the prudent imperialist, the
anti-communist and liberal-minded oligarch, have cause to wonder at least for
a moment at what he has wrought? Were the $2 trillion spent on military aid
and weaponry successful in preserving world hegemony? Is American society
more 'secure"? Have the Soviets acted less judiciously because the United
States establishment fought in Indo-China and spends $100 billion vearly on
its defense? What we do notice is that the United States has isolated itself from
the opinions of most nations. The United Nations General Assembly resolu-
tions have found the United States often voting with virtually no other nation
on matters of decolonization, trade, anti-apartheid, and so on, and yet, the
United States cannot break free from the United Nations. The question which
is then raised by the citizenry in neighborhood bars, church groups, and local
business clubs is a very practical one. What has been the value of the imperial
adventure to them, and to their community? The distribution of the tax bur-
den is such that it is the poor and the middle classes which pay for the empire,
not those oligarchs who benefit most from it. As Quincy Wright has said in
t11. J. BLUM, supra note 10, at 285-86.
112. Interview with John T. Connor, Executive Vice President of the Trade and Economic
Council, on NBC Television (Jan. 9, 1976).
113. Seminar given by Leslie Minigot, Director, Institute for International Relations, Univer-
sity of the West Indies, Port of Spain, Trinidad, at the Institute for Policy Studies, Washington,
D.C. (Fall 1975). It must be noted that there is greater official and military interest in the Carib-
bean ostensibly to counteract the Cuban support for Puerto Rican independence.
114. The Village Voice, Feb. 16, 1976, at 85, col. 1.
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his monumental Study of War, imperialism is not beneficial to a nation as a
whole: 115
Imperialism, therefore, tends to attach an exaggerated importance to nation-
als engaged in political or economic activity abroad, regarding them as the
pioneers of empire. "Imperial welfare" is, therefore, interpreted as requiring
the protection not only of the various groups and interests in the home terri-
tory but, to an even greater extent, the protection of all or certain interests
abroad. These "interests" are interpreted, however, not in the purely eco-
nomnic sense in which the individuals immediaiely involved may interpret
them but rather in the sense of instruments for expanding the state's imperial
domain, influence, and power....
Because of the costs of military and military armament, empires have sel-
dom proved economically profitable for the population of the home country.
The average plane of living of the Swiss and Scandinavian peoples without
colonies has been as high or higher than that of the British and French peo-
ple With great empires. It is possible that empires have served to maintain
certain interests of the privileged classes and to provide a safety valve for the
energies of a type of personality who might become leaders of revolutions in
the home territory....
Thus, while imperialism may temporarily expand the opportunities for cap-
italism, its long-run effect is to bring about the same tendencies toward state
socialism and militarism that nationalism inclines us toward.
There is an added horror which surrounds us. The world continues to
suffer the consequences of Churchill's and Roosevelt's "foresight," that "in all
the circumstances our policy should be to keep the matter [the atomic bomb]
so far as we can control it in American and British hands and leave the
French and Russians to do what they can." ' 6 The national security state itself
is predicated on atomic weaponry. Elsewhere in this essay I have adverted to
the important role which nuclear weapons and military technology had in
building the national security state. The lengths to which state apparatus
sought blindly to insist on the guilt of the accused in the Oppenheimer and
Rosenberg cases is instructive on this point. The judge in the Rosenberg case
assured the Rosenbergs that they had caused the Korean war because they
had "leaked" secrets to the Russians and that, in consequence, they had on
their hands the blood of thousands of Americans.' 1 7 Of course such cases
were used to justify and strengthen the security apparatus.
The attitude of protecting the secret of the bomb and using nuclear
weapons as the first and final arbiter of state relations was established prior to
its existence. In 1944, according to the historian Martin Sherwin, Niels Bohr
tried desperately to get Roosevelt and Churchill to invite "Soviet participation
in postwar atomic energy planning before the bomb was a certainty and be-
115. Q. WRIGHT, A STUDY OF WAR 1189-92 (2d ed. 1965).
116. M. SHERWIN, supra note 12, at 108.
117. M. SCHNEIR & W. SCHNEIR, INVITATION TO AN INQUEST 170 (1965).
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fore the war was over."11 He had wanted the Russians to be informed of the
Manhattan Project and hoped for a situation in which scientists would be in-
strumental in bringing about a modus vivendi in nuclear armaments. For his
troubles Churchill said of Bohr: 1 9
Enquiries should be made regarding the activities of Professor Bohr and steps
taken to ensure that he is responsible for no leakage of information particu-
larly to the Russians. I did not like the man when you showed him to me,
with his hair all over his head, at Downing Street. How did he come into this
business? ... He says he is in close correspondence with a Russian professor.
What is this all about? It seems to me Bohr ought to be confined or at any
rate made to see that he is very near the edge of mortal crimes.
So now we have followed the conventional wisdom about holding on to the
"secrets of the bombs, finding means to threaten with them, constantly in-
creasing the numbers of them until we have over 30,000 of them in place
each of them greater in explosive power than those used at Hiroshima and
Nagasaki." 2 " We have heard often of how horrible it would be if an irrespon-
sible leader, usually envisioned as being from a third world country, should
obtain control of nuclear weapons. But it should not be forgotten that it was
the United States that used the weapons and accepted the recommendations
of Stimson and others that they be used against a "vital war plant employing a
large number of workers and closely surrounded by workers' homes."1 2 1
And while we are aware of the dangers of the nuclear arms race, our
leadership continues to assert the use of nuclear weapons as a first use and
first strike weapon, even as we know that at least six nations presently have
them. The question which this raises is a double one. We have been told in a
Supreme Court case that neither the Constitution nor the United States is a
"suicide pact."1 2 2 Yet these weapons make clear that states have become en-
tities which hold the mortgage on the lives of the citizenry. Do we have no
rights as citizens against this state of affairs? And what are the human and
natural rights of a citizenry against a national security system which leads to
violence, anxiety and genocide? As Craig Comstock has pointed out, the arms
race will lead to our sudden ruin; the brush-fire war policy will lead to a
waste of money; and fear of dissident groups, racial minorities, and the un-
employed will lead to police repression: "Most serious perhaps, to the degree
that we rely on these kinds of violence done in our name, we will be unable to
118. M. SHERWIN, supra note 12, at 110.
119. Id.
120. Center for Defense Information, America's Nuclear Arsenal, I (Winter 1975). This is a
somewhat conservative estimate. In a conversation with the Director of Public Affairs for the
Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Pedro San Juan, the number of nuclear warheads of all
sizes in the United States arsenal is, according to him, over 40,000.
121. M. SHERWIN, supra note 12, at 144-5.
122. M. RASKIN, BEING AND DoING 36 (1971).
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move toward policies of cooperation (where possible), disengagement (where
necessary), or political development toward a more humane society."' 23
We may begin to find insights to answer these questions by reviewing the
Nuremberg and Asian War Crimes Trials so that we can comprehend pro-
scribed behavior on the part of governments. In the Ninety-fourth Congress,
Representative Robert Kastenmeier and thirty-seven colleagues introduced
legislation to set up a system of personal accountability of government offi-
cials.' 24 It uses the standards that the Americans had applied to the Jap-
anese and Germans after the second world war, including bureaucratic stan-
dards of behavior developed prior to the beginning of the cold war. These
standards can reach the entire issue of the national security apparatus because
they are based not on values which are imperial in nature but on a recogni-
tion that governments must be controlled if civilization is not to be lost. This
legislation begins to open the debate on national security standards. It could
be used as an opening wedge to tame and transform the national security
bureaucracy.
The development of scientific and technological wizardry in relation to the
ability of a bureaucracy to organize the resources of the society for military
and defense purposes has resulted in armaments becoming the measure of
state power. But, as the armaments race deepens, so does the moral con-
tradiction to it become more obvious. This moral contradiction is also re-
flected in the fact that the armaments themselves increase anxiety, distort the
value and priority structure within the arming nation, and ultimately cause an
interdependent link between military bureaucracies of opposing sides who use
each other to rationalize their commitment to arming.
It is not too late to break this dance of death. In this context, three spe-
cific and immediate cquestions are to be considered. (1) If the United States
were now to stop any further production of nuclear weapons and missiles,
would it be any less secure? (2) Should not American government officials be
held to a standard of personal accountability, as outlined in Kastenmeier's
proposed bill,' 2 5 so that aggressive war will not be a part of the national se-
curity bureaucrat's kit? (3) Should people in the armed forces be able to
unionize for wages, hours, and a code of ethics which would exclude the use
of genocidal weapons and participation in aggressive wars? In other words,
should soldiers and sailors have the power to limit the mode of weaponry and
destruction by abiding by an oath of conduct that eschews such weaponry and
acts as a control over unconstitutional wars of aggression?
While such questions must now be opened and debated in society as a
123. N. SANFORD & C. COMSTOCK, SANCTIONS FOR EW'ii 293 (1971).
124. 121 CoNc. REC. H6396 (daily ed. July 8, 1975) (introduction of H.R. 8388, the Official
Accountability Act of 1975, by Representtative Robert Kastenmeier).
125. Id.
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whole, it is still necessary to press for disarmament arrangements through the
national security bureaucracies as they are presently organized. In 1961, the
United States and the Soviet Union agreed to the McCloy-Zorin "eight points"
which outlined principles for obtaining universal disarmament. 12 This men-
oranduin could be used as a basis for reopening the disarmament question.
In 1963 the signatories to the partial Test Ban Treaty proclaimed as their
principal aim "the speediest possible achievement of an agreement on general
and complete disarmament under strict international control in accordance
with the objectives of the United Nations which Would put an end to the arma-
ments race and eliminate the incentive to the production and testing of all
kinds of weapons, including nuclear weapons.' -2 7
It remains possible to set the motion for general disarmament in three
stages:
As a first stage, the United States must undertake unilateral steps, such as
banning future missile production as well as uranium and plutoniu procLuc-
tion. Outmoded alliance commitments which justify elaborate military forces
must be transformed. A process of "agonizing reappraisal" and reconsidera-
tion must be instituted in the bureaucracy so that policy decisions for disar-
nanent will not be sabotaged.
This will make possible a second stage which will include the disarmament
of troops, nuclear weapons, and missiles from different regions of the world.
Thus, for example, the nuclear free zone concept should be reinitiated for
the Pacific. The context fot discussion on disarmament in the second stage
could begin in the United Nations Security Council with the permanent men-
bers laying out the basis for determining the questions and concerns of dis-
armament. Thus in 1977 the United States, for example, should convene a
United Nations Security Council meeting with a series of studies about disar-
mament, including the means of accomplishing and preserving it. These dis-
armament proposals would be debated in the Council for at least a year dlur-
ing which time an agreed upon position would develop. That position would
include these steps: consensus as to what nations should do on their own
without inspection; the reduction of missiles and nuclear weapons, unilaterally
and through negotiation; development of inspection techniques and collateral
forms of inspection; budget examinations as suggested under the Helsinki
agreements; and the reduction and abolition of armaments over a period of'
ten years. Past plans have correctly called for the staged reduction of arma-
ments in which the great powers would reduce their forces first in the context
of a worldwide disarmament and arms control plan. Less heavily armed na-
tions would be more likely to follow suit.
In a third stage the success of so-called "confidence building" measures
126. Declaration of Disarmament, DEP'T STATE Bui.,, Oct. 16, 1976. at 650.
127. NuclCar Weapons Test Ban, Aug. 5, 1963, 2 U.S.T. 1314, 1316, TIAS No. 5433.
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would cause national leaders to move to the abolition of weapons and armed
forces. Such plans should now be exhumed and studied by Congress in the
light of current needs and realities. It should be noted that certain new plans
have been proposed which bear careful study because they include the actions
of non-governmental groups and citizens. For example, the plan for general
disarmament put forward by the Nobel Peace Prize winner Sean MacBride
outlines actions to be taken by non-governmental groups with transnational
and United Nations organizations."'
The Department of Defense hopes to increase the defense budget to $160
billion per year in the next five years.12 It is to be expected that the Soviet
defense budget and those of other nations will correspondingly increase. Pres-
ently the world is spending $315 billion a Near on defense."l " There is no
security or budgetary relief in sight. Our choices are stark and obvious.
CONCLUSION
The national security state is the synthesis of state power and capitalism.
Its emergence as a political form turned out to be a crucial step in keeping a
level of unity within the United States as it attempted to sustain an imperial
or hegemonic thrust in the world. But there has been no way for it to tran-
scend its own internal contradictions. It has been grounded on continuous
preparation for war, on a passive and receptive society which would automati-
cally accept the judgments of the administrative leadership, on a code of loy-
alty to authority which would guard people against cultural diversity and
ideological impurity, and on a system of economic growth which would mask
costs of armaments and empire. It has hoped to hide behind the bonapartist
skirts of a president and has sought to hide its own actions from public view.
None of these conditions now pertain in the United States. The national se-
curity state consensus lasted for approximately fourteen years before it be-
came clear that its specifications had nothing to do with the democratizing
process, indeed, that it was authoritarian and criinnal in its mode of opera-
tions. It was both natural and predictable that the democratizing process
would put the national security apparatus on the block.
In an important sense the United States is a Hegelian society in that peo-
ple are invariably trying to actualize human ideals. They do so out of either a
128. Proposal for a World Disarmament Conference (1975). There is to be a special session of
the General Assembly of the United Nations in Angurst 1978 to discuss comprehensive disarma-
ment proposals.
129. Based on $120 billion FY 1978 budget-a straight line projection of 9 to I I per cent
which reflects a 4 per cent increase per year in quantlom of men and machines for the next 3
years, plus a 6 per cent rate of inflation per year for 3 years. These are very conservative esti-
imatCs.
130. UNITED NATIOs ASS'. CoxTROLLNG t.H E I CONVENITIONXL ARNrs RACE 4 (1976).
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sense of pain with their current condition, or a sense of surplus which they
would like to share with others. The process of this actualization is often
humorous, sometimes grotesque and perverted. Nevertheless, the impulse is
present. It is a democratic impulse which seeks a social contract in which all
members of the society participate. The principle of citizenship assumes that
people have individual rights and rights of participation. This process of
"leveling," which began with Locke's defense of the bourgeois class so that it
would be included in decision making, has found its natural historic result in
the cultural, political, and economic struggles which have occurred in the
United States over the last fifteen years. That Locke's ideas were meant to be
restricted to men of property and wealth no longer matters. What does mat-
ter about his view is that governing depends upon the governed. Once it is
concluded (and this occurred through monumental struggles of revolution,
civil war, and social protest) that there shall be no slavery but rather equality
between people of different color, that women are equal to men, that homo-
sexuals have rights and are also equal, that people should have a participa-
tory voice in their place of work, then the society is on a collision course with
its state apparatus.
It has been the historic role of liberalism to distill the changes which the
militancy of revolt reflects and to replace this militancy with an ordered
method of bringing about change. As Chateaubriand said, "'[W]e must pre-
serve the political work which is the fruit of the Revolution . . . but we inust
eradicate the Revolution from this work.' ""'
However, liberalism lost its mediating role and the practitioners of liber-
alism found themselves as political covers for the national security state. They
were coopted and they became the fig leaf for imperialism. Liberals embraced
the national security state as the compromise between fascism and socialism
within the United States. They worked on means of organizing imperialism
and of using the Keynesian principle of economic growth and defense spend-
ing as a central mechanism of avoiding class conflict. But this choice has given
rise to new perplexities. Liberals have not been able to hold back the dual
state, internalize the cultural revolution of the 1960s in their thought and
action, or criticize in any fundamental sense the corporate oligopoly system.
Thus, the political question is whether liberals have any sort of role to plax as
mediators in a society whose ideological compass is broken. It would seem
that they have none unless they renounce the national secuirity apparatus and
develop a full employment economy which is not dependent on the whims of
corporations or the defense department. They need also realize that the
democratizing process must include economic democracy and the means of
holding in common what is basic to the well-being of the society. These are
131. G. NO\ACK. supra note 4. at 120.
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matters which must be debated locally, in schools, factories, churches, and
neighborhood bars.
The society is at a turning point. And in this regard so is the legal profes-
sion. Either we will surrender representative democracy, embracing instead
different forms of corporate fascism and bureaucratic control (military, police,
and social) which cannot be halted through citizen action and democratic pro-
cesses, or we (including the legal profession) will begin the difficult task of
dismantling the national security apparatus. It does not seem likely to me that
those who struggled in the sixties to develop a new meaning of democracy
will settle for bureaucratic or corporate fascism. And those who are neutral
on the question will be less likely to acquiesce in fascist or bonapartist defor-
mations once it is clear that they are inefficient, and that they provide only
insecurity, unemployment, imperial wars, a deepening arms race, and a pro-
cess of repressive exclusion which reduces politics to an empty game.
